However, it is associated with relatively high costs and is also less efficient in absence of assertive external debt management policies. In the presence of congestion externalities associated with deleveraging, optimal external borrowing-tax-cum-IR-hoarding-subsidy reduces the cost as well as the scale of hoarding IR.
Introduction
Macro prudential supervision and the role of central banks have evolved substantially over the past few decades. This evolution reflects learning by doing, reaction to crises, as well as changes in our understanding of prudential supervision. The Laissez Faire view of the role of central banks has gravitated from a "benign-neglect" view of economic stabilization [Lucas (1987 [Lucas ( , 2003 ] towards the Taylor rule, wherein monetary policy is set by a rule rather than discretion. To recall, about two decades ago Robert Lucas showed that the costs of business cycles in a calibrated macroeconomic model are trivial, implying that there may be little role for central banks' stabilization policies or for fiscal policy. In the early 1990s, Taylor's influential paper surmised a simple rule as a plausible guide for central banks' policies [Taylor (1993) ].
This happened against the background of a remarkable decline in macroeconomic volatility and cost of risk during the 1990s and early 2000s, a trend that has hence been referred to as "the great moderation." The "great moderation" induced observers to presume the beginning of the end of costly business cycles. Key policy makers, led by Fed's Chair Alan Greenspan, advocated a nonactivist role of central banks. The implication was that central banks should refrain from policies aimed at curbing the appreciation of real assets ("asset inflation"), focusing instead on "goods inflation." 1 This reflected the spirit of late 1990s and early 2000s, when the presumption was 1 To recall, former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan advocated a hands-off approach to asset prices during the U.S. expansion that lasted six years until December 2007. He said it was easier to clean up the mess of a bust than to spot bubbles and that monetary policy was too blunt to deflate them. "As events evolved, we recognized that, despite our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact -that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence. Moreover, it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified early, could be pre-empted short of the central bank inducing a substantial contraction in economic activity -the very outcome we would be seeking to avoid. " March 2, 2005, to House Budget Committee. that private intermediation with minimal regulatory oversight provide superior results. The view fitted well with Lucas' take on the cost of the business cycles, and the difficulty in identifying 'bubbles' in real time.
The Lucas assessment of business cycle costs was challenged by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and other studies. They had consistently found that volatility exerts a significant negative impact on long-run (trend) growth, which is exacerbated in poorer countries. 2 In a similar vein, studies found that the 1997-8 crisis had lingering adverse growth effects on affected countries [Cerra and Saxena (2008) In this paper, we take such a nuanced view of the role of central banks. The fact that exante we are unable to identify "a bubble" or a crisis does not negate the role of policies aimed at reducing the probability and the adverse impact of unsustainable real appreciations. Applying
Bayesian logic, policy makers should react to signals that indicate heightened probability of a crisis, even if there is no way of knowing a-priori the timing and depth of the crisis. The intellectual underpinning of this approach involves costly financial intermediation. In order to finance investment, firms can turn to external sources, such as bank loans, equity or corporate bonds, or rely on internal funds, such as retained earnings. However, capital markets tend to be thin or practically non-existent during sudden stops and deleveraging crises, thereby constraining investment to be funded internally or by banks. As was shown by Townsend (1979) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , more costly verification and enforcement of contracts combined with higher economic volatility increase the cost of external funds, thereby reducing investment.
When recessions occur, internal funds dry up leading to a greater contraction of investment than would occur with well-functioning capital markets. This in turn induces concavity in the association between shocks and investment. Under such circumstances, more volatile shocks would reduce average GDP and, potentially, the economic growth. This mechanism is only one In the next section we overview prudential supervision in emerging markets (EMs) exposed to capital inflows, and deleveraging vulnerabilities. We identity conditions under which prudential supervision that reduces economic volatility has sizable beneficial effects. We end the paper with a discussion linking our results to recent policy trends.
2.
Prudential supervision, capital inflows, and deleveraging vulnerabilities to the financial integration, the demand for reserves provided self-insurance against volatile trade flows.
However, financial integration added the need to self-insure against volatile financial flows. By the nature of financial markets, the exposure to rapidly changing demands for foreign currency triggered by financial volatility exceeds the one triggered by trade volatility [see Aizenman and Lee (2007) ].
EMs, including Korea, potentially exceed the social optimum [see Jeanne and Ranciere (2005) ].
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A broader self-insurance view is that IR provide a buffer, both against deleveraging initiated by foreign parties, as well as the sudden wish of domestic residents to acquire new external assets, i.e., "sudden capital flight" [see Calvo (2006) Institutions. Yet, short of a major overhaul of the global financial architecture, proper management of external debt of a country remains a key challenge of EMs. While moving to financial autarky is overkill, ignoring the benefits of external debt management has proven to be very costly. Among 21 EMs, 9 countries belong to the first group.
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To gain further insight, Aizenman and Yi (2009) compare the pre-crisis demand for IR/GDP of countries that experienced sizable depletion of their IR, to that of countries that did not, and find differential patterns across the two groups. Trade related factors (such as trade openness, and the primary goods export/total export ratio, especially large oil export/total export) seem to be more significant in accounting for the pre-crisis IR/GDP levels of countries that experienced a sizable depletion of IR in the first phase of the crisis. These findings suggest that countries that internalized their large exposure to trade shocks before the crisis used their IR as a 12 The EMs' sample is composed of the countries listed in the FTSE and MSCI emerging market list. It does not include Singapore and Hong-Kong because of their special economic structure, specializing in entrepôt services. In addition, due to the dramatic effect of the IMF's aid on Hungary's reserves changes, it has been excluded from the sample (Hungary's IR had increased nearly by half in the two months after the IMF's stabilization package was put in place). The study also excluded Morocco and Pakistan due to unavailability of the relevant data. 13 Countries facing large losses in stocks of IR include Brazil (BRA), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), buffer stock in the first phase of crisis. The IR losses of these countries followed an inverted logistical curve. After a rapid initial depletion of IR, these countries reached within 7 months a markedly declining rate of IR depletion, and lost not more than one-third of their pre crisis IR. In contrast, in case of countries that refrained from a sizable depletion of IR during the first crisis phase, financial factors seem more important than trade factors in explaining the initial level of IR/GDP. The patterns of using IR by the first group of countries, and refraining from using IR by the second group, are consistent with the 'fear of losing reserves'. Such a fear may reflect a country's concern that dwindling IR may signal greater vulnerability to run on its currency, thereby triggering such a run on its remaining reserves. This fear may be related to a country's apprehension that, as the duration of the crisis in unknown, depleting IR quickly may be suboptimal. Rapid depletion of its reserves exposes a country to the risk of a swift and, therefore, potentially economically and politically-difficult adjustment in its real economy.
These findings suggest that there exists a clear structural difference in the pre-crisis demand for IR between EMs that were willing versus those that were unwilling to spend a sizable share of their IR during the first phase of the 2008-9 crisis. Trade related factors are more significant in accounting for the pre-crisis IR level of the countries that were willing to accept a sizable depletion of their IR in the first phase of the crisis, in line with the buffer stock interpretation of demand for IR. Countries that depleted their reserves in the first phase of the crisis refrained from drawing their IR below a two-third of the pre-crisis level. The majority of these EMs used less than one-fourth of their pre crisis IR. Countries whose pre crisis demand for
IRs was more sensitive to financial factors, refrained from using IR altogether and achieved external adjustment through larger depreciations of their currencies than those put in place by the countries that were sensitive to trade factors. The results found by Aizenman and Yi (2009) suggest that the adjustment of EMs during the on-going global liquidity crisis has been constrained more by their fear of losing IR than by their fear of floating.
Countries' choice of currency depreciation instead of reserve depletion also suggests that some opted to revisit the gains from financial globalization. Earlier research suggests that EMs that increased their financial integration during the 1990s and mid 2000s, accumulated IRs due to precautionary motives, to obtain self insurance against sudden stops and deleveraging crises. Yet, the on-going global crisis suggests that the levels of IR required in order for this self-insurance to work may be comparable to that of a country's gross external financial exposure [see Park (2009) analyzing Korea's challenges during the crisis]. In these circumstances, prudential supervision that would tighten the link between short-term external borrowing and hoarding IR would mitigate the excessive exposure to deleveraging risks induced by short-term external borrowing.
This objective can be accommodated by a Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme that induces domestic agents to internalize the externality associated with external borrowing and a deleveraging crisis. A virtue of such a scheme is that the optimal borrowing tax funds the optimal subsidy on hoarding IR, thereby mitigating concerns about costly hoarding of large stockpiles of IR needed to self-insure against a deleveraging crisis.
2.1
The Fire Sale deleveraging externality and the case for a Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme. given, taken together, their actions as a group induce the fire sale prices. This leads to a fire-sale externality [see Krugman (2000) on the experience of Korea in the 1997-8 crisis]. 14 This firesale externality reduces the marginal social benefit of borrowing below the private benefit, and increasse the marginal social benefit of hoarding IR above the private one. Aizenman (2009) outlines the case of supplementing hoarding IR with a Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme.
Properly designed, the scheme reduces the distortion i.e. external borrowing, thereby inducing borrowers to co-finance precautionary hoarding of IR by means of the borrowing tax.
To recall, Eichengreen et al. (2003) , and the related balance sheet literature showed that external debt associated with maturity and currency mismatches increases the downside risk of costly sudden stops. Greater balance sheet exposure frequently entails higher real depreciation triggered by deleveraging, greater distress of the domestic banking system, and ultimately higher output costs of a sudden stop and deleveraging crisis. If most foreign and domestic agents are price takers, each ignores its marginal impact on increasing the expected cost of such a crisis.
This in turn entails an externality akin to "congestion", calling for a Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme. In the Appendix we overview a minimal model seeking to explain the optimal selfinsurance offered by IR in mitigating the output effects of liquidity shocks and the gain from the Pigovian tax-cum-subsidy scheme. The structure of the model is akin to that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Investment in a long term project is undertaken prior to realization of liquidity shocks. A key element of the model is that the cost of deleveraging increases with the aggregate deleveraging pressure. Under such circumstances, competitive financial intermediation induces each bank to overlook the impact of its deleveraging on the deleveraging costs of all other banks, thereby inducing a fire-sale macro externality. optimal borrowing tax is defined by the externality. Note that Figure 3 is a partial equilibrium treatment drawn for a given level of IR. A similar figure can be drawn for the bank's and the planner's demands for IR. In comparison to the initial no borrowing tax equilibrium, the impact of the optimal tax and subsidy is to reduce the distorted activity. I.e., external borrowing drops, and IR hoarding is co-financed the by taxing the activities that expose the economy to the need to self-insure.
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It can be shown that, even if the policy maker is prevented from implementing tax policies that raise net revenues, Laissez Faire is not optimal. In these circumstances, the fire-sale externalities can be dealt with by dynamic reserve requirements imposed on external borrowing.
Such a policy should apply uniformly to all banks operating in the EM, including branches affiliated with foreign banks. Recalling Rodrik (2006) may help put this discussion in a broader context. Rodrik (2006) evaluated the costs and benefits of hoarding IR and concluded that EMs "have over-invested in the costly strategy of reserve accumulation and under-invested in capitalaccount management policies to reduce their short-term foreign liabilities." The proposed taxcum-subsidy scheme described above outline a strategy in the spirit of Rodrik's assessment, tightening the links between hoarding IR and managing short-term foreign liabilities.
3.
The recent experience
In the current context, in absence of a deep reform of global financial architecture, EMs remain exposed to sudden stops and deleveraging crises. The proposed external borrowing taxcum-reserves hoarding-subsidy, if enacted before the inflow of capital begins, would facilitate more sustainable financial integration. A recent example of a country's experimenting with such 15 The design of the FDIC deposit insurance scheme in the US may be viewed as generating outcomes similar to those of the tax-cum-subsidy scheme outlined in this paper. The FDIC charges insurance premiums on bank deposits at a rate that ideally should reflect the riskiness of banks' investments. The insurance premium is akin to a tax on banks' borrowing. The provision of insurance by the FDIC acts in ways similar to subsidizing hoarding liquid resources to provide self-insurance. As with any insurance scheme, care should be taken to deal with the possibility of moral hazard. See Levy Yeyati (2008) The resumption of inflows to Emerging Markets and the hoarding of IR may provide the illusion that 'all is well.' Yet, as the crisis of 2008-9 clearly illustrated, hoarding IR remains a costly option, which may not be sufficient unless it is coupled with assertive policies directed at 16 Attempts to tax external borrowing include the Chilean scheme of the late 1990s. While the results of this scheme were debatable, one should keep in mind that this policy was not meaningfully tested in Chile, as the counterfactual experiment was impossible to implement. Chile was the best performing country in Latin America during the time when this policy was applied, and no sudden stop crisis affected it during that time. It remains debatable whether the relative stability of the Chilean economy was due to good luck, good institutions, or/and good policies [for further discussion, see type see Edwards (2000) and Cowan and de Gregorio (2005)]. Indeed, the recent experience of Brazil, China and India is probably the best case study of possible impact of external balance sheet management at times of heightened exposure to a sudden stop and deleveraging crises. The virtue of the tax-cum-subsidy scheme is that it would reduce the taxpayer's burden of financing the cost of hoarding IR, and will mitigate the balance sheet exposures associated with unchecked international portfolio flows. Such a scheme may also mitigate the political demand in EMs to spend the accumulated reserves. Taxing external borrowing would reduce the needed reserves. Such a tax-scheme would also help fund the accumulation of IR by activities that expose the economy to the need to self-insure.
The logic of our discussion may be viewed as an open economy extension of the growing recognition that the current global financial crisis calls for changes in the operations of central banks. In his presentation at the recent Jackson Hole symposium Charles Goodhart pointed out:
"So, rather than sticking to the banking paradigm, liquidity provision should be assessed within an insurance paradigm. Almost all insurance generates moral hazard; liquidity insurance is, clearly, no exception. The answer in general has been to set premia in fair accordance with the risks being run by the assured so that the provision of insurance at least breaks even for the insurer, in this case the Central Bank and through it the taxpayer.
What this should then involved in a continuing, and regular, measurement of the risks that the behaviour of the insured, both individually and as a system, are imposing on the insurer, i.e. the Central Banks, as the ultimate provider of liquidity, and the application of sanctions on such behaviour, sanctions that become tougher as the risks worsen. Both the calculation of such liquidity risk measure(s) and the design of the appropriate form and structure of sanctions are difficult, but both need to be done, and soon."
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Goodhart's discussion is in line with the need for central banks to focus on "muddling through"
the varying challenges they face as a result of the provision of liquidity insurance to systemic agents. In contrast to Alan Greenspan's seductive "market-stabilizing private regulatory forces" doctrine prevalent in the 1990s and 2000s, wherein central banks' role in active policies was muted, the current crisis has clearly brought to the fore the necessity of active macroeconomic supervision. While most of the discussion generated by the crisis has so far focused on the OECD economies (typically in the context of a closed economy), EMs remain exposed to unique challenges associated with external debt management. This paper illustrates that a proper external borrowing tax-cum-hoarding IR subsidy improves the efficiency of the economy by reducing the cost of insurance schemes provided by central banks in emerging market economies. The gap between the negligible liquidation elasticity of each bank and the sizable macro deleveraging elasticity manifests itself in the fire-sale congestion externality.
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Aizenamn (2009) shows that, if the only policy applied is a borrowing tax, then the optimal tax needed to induce banks to internalize the fire-sale externality is 
